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The Quest for Integration: 
Australian Approaches to Security and 
Development in the Pacific Islands 
Sinclair Dinnen and Abby McLeod 
With the deployment of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands in July 2003, the 
former Howard Government initiated its robust new engagement with Australia's Pacific island 
neighbours.  Interventions with an initial security focus have been portals to broader and 
ambitious state-building exercises.  The quest to integrate security and development agendas 
lies at the heart of 'the new interventionism'.  This article examines the evolution and character 
of this approach, as well as reviewing its implementation in the two case studies of Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) and Papua New Guinea (ECP).  It also discusses the significance for 
Australia/Pacific relations of the recent change of government in Canberra and the differences 
(and similarities) to be anticipated under Prime Minister Rudd's Labor Government. 
The deployment of the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in July 2003 marked the beginnings of the former 
Howard Government’s renewed engagement with the Pacific islands 
countries.  Substantial resources have since been mobilised to assist 
Australia’s island neighbours address a broad array of security and 
development problems.  These are manifested in disappointing social and 
economic indicators, poor standards of governance, as well as growing 
levels of political instability and conflict in some countries.  In addition to the 
post-conflict intervention in Solomon Islands, Australia’s more active role in 
the so-called ‘arc of instability’ includes the Enhanced Cooperation Program 
(ECP) in Papua New Guinea (PNG), attempts to strengthen the capacity and 
role of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the secondment of senior Australian 
officers to head several Pacific police forces, as well as substantial financial 
and technical assistance to struggling Nauru. 
While Australia’s new interventionism in the Pacific has been welcomed, 
implementation of this approach has proved difficult.  The internal diversity of 
the Pacific militates against uniform solutions.  In the case of multifaceted 
interventions like RAMSI there have been technical and logistical challenges 
to overcome, while their intrusive character has inevitably aroused local 
sensitivities.  Technical issues include that of coordination among the large 
number of Australian agencies involved, selecting and mobilising appropriate 
Australian human resources, as well as addressing the complexities of 
capacity development in a variety of institutional and cultural settings.   
Evolving interventions require external actors to move between working in an 
operational mode to building the capacity of local counterparts.  This is an 
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inherently difficult transition, demanding rare skills, continuous learning and 
adaptation, as well as a willingness to operate in a fashion (e.g. guiding 
rather than doing) that is not typically rewarded in Australian workspaces.   
Moreover many members of the expanding cohort of Australian actors 
expected to build local capacity have little prior experience in this field.   
Dealing with the political dimensions of the larger interventions has proved 
particularly difficult.  This was illustrated in the progressive deterioration in 
Australia’s bilateral relations with both Solomon Islands and PNG in the final 
two years of the Howard administration—a development that overshadowed 
the accomplishments of the previous five years.  With its commitment to 
repairing these damaged relations whilst maintaining a prominent role in the 
Pacific, the Rudd Government’s election in November 2007 was greeted 
warmly throughout the region.  How far the new Australian Government is 
able to successfully negotiate the obstacles encountered by its predecessor 
and translate its engagements into tangible and sustainable improvements in 
the countries concerned remains to be seen.  Early signs are certainly 
promising although the long-term challenges remain formidable.    
The recent change in Australian Government provides a timely opportunity to 
reflect on the character, successes and failures of the new interventionism 
over the past five years, as well as to consider the approach taking shape 
under the Rudd administration.  An underlying theme concerns the changing 
character of the security-development nexus in Australian policy towards the 
Pacific islands.  The assertion that security and development are inextricably 
linked has become something of a policy mantra in Australian and 
international policy circles in recent years.1  While recognition of the 
essential interdependence between these areas is a positive thing, it should 
not obscure the complexity of this relationship in different national settings 
and the real practical difficulties involved in aligning security and 
development policies.2  
The following section outlines some of the broad characteristics of the new 
interventionism and the strategic context of its initial emergence.  This is 
followed by case studies of RAMSI and the ECP, as well as an outline of the 
volatile nature of bilateral relations between Australia and its two largest 
Melanesian neighbours over the past two years.  The new Rudd approach 
as articulated in recent policy statements is then examined before a 
concluding discussion addressing some of the lessons learned. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, The Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 
Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (New York: United Nations, 2004).  
2 See Necla Tschirgi, Security and Development: Untangling the Relationship (New York: 
International Peace Academy, 2005). 
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The New Interventionism 
Australian concerns with the so-called ‘arc of instability’ beyond its northern 
and eastern shores have been prominent for at least the past decade.3  
Initially centred on the Indonesian archipelago following the demise of the 
Suharto regime, the arc has been extended gradually eastwards as the 
range of problems besetting the Pacific island countries have became more 
apparent.  These have been concentrated in the larger, mainly Melanesian, 
states of PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji, although difficulties are 
also evident in several smaller Polynesian countries.  As well as 
longstanding concerns with limited economic growth and rapid population 
expansion, the increase in corruption, poor governance, and deteriorating 
services and infrastructure, as well as political instability, law and order 
problems, and internal conflicts in some places have added to growing 
disquiet among Australian policy makers.  While few of these developments 
are new, their cumulative effect has  contributed to increasingly vivid 
depictions of a region confronted with the endemic problems commonly 
associated with more familiar global trouble zones such as sub-Saharan 
Africa.4  The nine-year long conflict in Bougainville with its devastating 
humanitarian and economic consequences, inter-group fighting in parts of 
the PNG Highlands, ethnic tensions in Guadalcanal and the armed takeover 
of Honiara in 2000, as well as Fiji’s ingrained ‘coup culture’, provide the 
principal examples of internal conflict in the Pacific islands. 
At one level, the range and complexity of these challenges reflects the 
diverse and unsettling impacts of processes of rapid change underway in 
Pacific societies, in combination with enduring colonial and pre-colonial 
legacies.  The exposure of PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu to the full 
forces of modernity and globalisation arrived relatively late in their respective 
histories.  At another level, they highlight the essential fragility of many 
Pacific island states, and the artificial and fragmented character of the larger 
political communities they formally encompass.5  From an Australian 
perspective, the Pacific arc has been viewed as a growing threat in its 
immediate neighbourhood and one requiring a robust response.  While PNG 
has long been the focus of Australian policy in the Pacific, reflecting strong 
historical and continuing ties, including trade and strategic interests, less 
interest was generally shown in the wider Pacific region. 
                                                 
3 See Robert Ayson, ‘The ‘arc of instability’ and Australia’s strategic policy’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2, (2007), pp. 215-231. 
4 See, for example, Ben Reilly, ‘The Africanisation of the South Pacific’, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 3 (2000), pp. 261-268.  For a critique of Reilly’s thesis, see Jon 
Fraenkel, ‘The Coming Anarchy in Oceania? A Critique of the ‘Africanisation’ of the South 
Pacific Thesis’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 42, no. 1 (March 2004), pp. 1-34; 
and David Chappell, ‘”Africanization” in the Pacific: Blaming Others for Disorder in the 
Periphery?’, Comparative Studies of Society and History, vol. 47, no. 2 (2005), pp. 286-317. 
5 See, for example, Sinclair Dinnen, 'Dilemmas of intervention and the building of state and 
nation', in Sinclair Dinnen and Stewart Firth (eds), Politics and State Building in Solomon 
Islands  (Canberra: Asia Pacific Press and ANU E Press, 2008), pp. 1-38. 
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LIMITED IMPACT OF  
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE 
The growing problems in the Pacific island countries despite high levels of 
development assistance from bilateral and multilateral donors have been 
viewed by some as evidence of the ineffectiveness of existing aid 
approaches.  Recurring criticism has been aimed at so-called ‘boomerang 
aid’, whereby the principal beneficiaries are viewed as the international 
managing contractors and individual consultants who traditionally have 
managed and implemented aid projects.6  Other critics such as Helen 
Hughes of the Sydney-based think tank, the Centre for Independent Studies, 
have argued that Australian aid to the Pacific not only fails to deliver on its 
promises but is crucially implicated in the dynamics of political and economic 
dysfunction in the islands by fuelling corruption and inducing debilitating 
levels of dependency among recipient states.7  These arguments about the 
downsides of aid struck a chord among elements of the Howard 
Government.  As the then Treasurer remarked in 2004,  
aid can hinder as well as help—it sometimes allows governments with poor 
policies and weak institutions to stave off essential reforms and rely on 
donors to provide essential services to their people.8   
While the complexity of aid and the measurement of its impacts is far greater 
than implied in these critiques, few would deny that the tangible returns from 
substantial long-term investment have been modest.9  This is particularly 
true of many of the large institutional strengthening projects that were 
formerly a staple of donors in the region.  For example, almost sixteen years 
of Australian project assistance to the Royal Papua New Guinea 
Constabulary (RPNGC) from 1989 to 2005 produced little sign of sustained 
improvement in the organisational and operational performance of the 
RPNGC and, on the contrary, considerable evidence of progressive 
deterioration.10  To be fair to development practitioners, shortcomings with 
existing approaches have led to considerable change, such as the adoption 
of sector-wide approaches in areas like health and law and justice, in the 
ongoing search for improved effectiveness.  The limitations of traditional 
approaches to aid nevertheless provided an important consideration in the 
evolution of the new interventionism. 
                                                 
6 See, AIDWATCH, Boomerang Aid: Not good enough Minister!, June 2005, pp. 1-12, 
<http://www.aidwatch.org.au/assets/aw00728/Boomerang%20aid%20final%20jun%2005.pdf> 
[Accessed 28 May 2008]. 
7 Helen Hughes, ‘Aid has failed the Pacific’, Issue Analysis, no. 33 (St Leonards: Centre for 
Independent Studies, 2003), pp. 1-31. 
8 Hon Peter Costello ‘The challenge of poverty reduction’, Address to the Australian Council for 
International Development Aid Dinner, Rydges Capital Hill, Canberra, 3 August 2004. 
9 The need to demonstrate the tangible impacts of Australian aid led to the creation of the Office 
of Development Effectiveness in 2006. 
10 See below, p. 36.  A PNG Government review of the RPNGC in 2004 described it as “close to 
collapse”. RPNGC Administrative Review Committee, Final Draft, 2004, p. 40.   
Australian Approaches to Security and Development in the Pacific Islands 
Volume 4, Number 2 (Winter 2008) - 27 - 
STATE FAILURE AND THE SECURITY IMPERATIVE 
Australia’s intervention in Solomon Islands in 2003 marked a significant 
departure from its former approach which was based on a sensibility to 
traditional notions of sovereignty and reliance on development assistance as 
the principal instrument of foreign policy.  The more hands-on approach 
emerged soon after the release of the Foreign and Trade Policy White 
Paper, Advancing the National Interest (2003),11 which while echoing the 
non-interventionist stance of previous years highlighted the increasing 
interrelatedness of aid and “regional stability and security”.  Australian aid 
was viewed as “an integral part of the government’s broader efforts to 
promote regional development and stability”12 and included an emphasis on 
improving “the capacities of police and judicial systems to strengthen stability 
and support local efforts to reduce tensions and conflict”.13  Some eight 
months after the release of the White Paper, the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID) called for more rigorous promotion of 
good governance.  Confronting corruption in the Pacific and enhancing law 
and order, peace and stability became AusAID priorities.  To this end, 
AusAID stated that “[t]o further assist our Pacific partners address their 
complex development challenges, Australia is adopting a more hands-on 
approach”.14 
The larger backdrop was the changing international strategic environment 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, and the 
bombings in Bali in 2002 and Jakarta in 2003, which in various ways 
underpinned and reinforced the emphasis on security.  With the ‘war on 
terror’ as the new prism for viewing international security and stability, 
considerable emphasis was placed on issues of state capacity.  That is, the 
capabilities of individual states to provide their citizens with fundamental 
public goods such as security, political participation, basic government 
services, and economic development.15  Whereas powerful and aggressive 
states had been conventionally viewed as the most likely sources of 
international conflict and instability, the new strategic framework reversed 
this by identifying weak and failing states with limited capabilities as the most 
serious threats to global peace.16  The spectre of state failure, previously 
viewed in terms of its humanitarian consequences, was recast as a major 
security risk in the post-9/11 period.  States that had failed or were likely to 
                                                 
11 DFAT, Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper 
(Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2003). 
12 Ibid., p. 94. 
13 Ibid. 
14 AusAID, Papua New Guinea and the Pacific—a Development Perspective (Canberra: 
AusAID, 2003), p. 16. 
15 See, for example, Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of 
Terror (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation and Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
16 In 2002, the United States re-defined its National Security Strategy to warn that ‘America is 
now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones’. The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America (Washington DC: White House, 2002), p. iv.  
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fail were now seen as potential incubators for all manner of illicit activities, 
thereby posing serious threats to regional and international security.  The 
security imperative thus became the core rationale for a spate of 
international state-building interventions in global trouble spots designed to 
bolster failing states and transform failed ones into effective states capable 
of delivering security, stability and development.   
Although a variety of factors would have influenced the Howard 
Government’s decision to intervene in Solomon Islands in mid-2003, the 
public case for intervention was set squarely within the failed state paradigm.   
Then Foreign Minister Alexander Downer stated that the government  
will not sit back and watch while a country slips inexorably into decay and 
disorder… The last thing we can afford is an already susceptible region 
being overwhelmed by more insidious and direct threats to Australia.17 
However, the clearest articulation of this position was a report of the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute—published several weeks before the 
RAMSI deployment—that identified Solomon Islands as the Pacific’s first 
failing state.18  If left to its own devices, it warned, Solomon Islands risked 
becoming “a petri dish in which international and non-state security threats 
can develop and breed”.19  A “sustained and comprehensive multinational 
effort” was proposed to undertake rehabilitation work with the consent of the 
Solomon Islands Government.20  Restoration of law and order would be 
followed by efforts to “build new political structures and security institutions 
and address underlying social and economic problems”.21 
SECURITY, POLICING AND ‘CO-OPERATIVE INTERVENTION’ 
The new interventionism exhibited some common features.  Concerns with 
security became more pronounced and manifested themselves not only in 
terms of official justifications for particular interventions but also in the higher 
priority accorded to enhancing domestic security capabilities in the countries 
concerned.  This meant particular emphasis on building the capacity of 
domestic police and related law and justice agencies.  Strengthening law 
enforcement and the rule of law provided a key aspect of the police-led 
regional mission in Solomon Islands, but was also reflected in the growing 
number of Pacific recipients of Australian assistance and in the rising levels 
of assistance provided for this purpose.  For example, in 2004-5, $119 
million was allocated for policing and law and justice programs in East Timor, 
PNG, Fiji, South Pacific Regional, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, compared 
                                                 
17 Alexander Downer, ‘Security in an Unstable World’, Address to the National Press Club, 
Canberra, 26 June 2003.  
18 Elsina Wainwright, Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands 
(Canberra: ASPI, 2003).  
19 Ibid., p. 13. 
20 Ibid., p. 39. 
21 Ibid. 
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with expenditure of $69 million in 2003-4 and $30 million in 2002-3.22  
Internal security and effective conflict-resolution mechanisms were now 
viewed as a precondition for the advancement of more conventional 
development objectives such as the eradication of poverty.  Indeed, one of 
the four key regional themes in the Pacific Regional Aid Strategy 2004-2009 
is,  
improved law and justice and security through support for police and legal 
institutions underpinning adherence to the rule of law, assisting regional 
security initiatives, addressing potential instability and the causes of conflict 
and investing in peace.23 
The modality of assistance delivery adopted by the Australian Government 
also changed.  Support to Pacific islands’ institutions, including police, law 
and justice agencies, had traditionally been managed by AusAID, with 
program design and implementation performed by private contractors.  While 
the private sector continues to play an important role, there has been 
increasing resort to seconded officials from relevant Australian Government 
agencies, including the Australian Federal Police (AFP), to implement 
international capacity development programs.  This change was, in part, a 
response to the limited impact of traditional forms of technical assistance.  It 
was also argued that the use of career public servants provides the extra 
authority of the Australian Government and helps build long-term 
organisational relationships between Australian departments and their 
regional counterparts thereby leading to more durable processes of capacity 
development.  Greater reliance on Australian public servants was part of a 
broader shift towards a ‘whole-of-government’ approach in the delivery of 
Australian development assistance.24  This has been promoted as a more 
integrated approach to capacity development, particularly in environments 
where systemic weaknesses exist across an array of domestic institutions. 
Emblematic of the shift towards greater whole of government collaboration in 
the delivery of development assistance—and further emphasising the 
association between security and development—a Strategic Partnership 
Agreement between AusAID and the AFP was formed in 2004, recognising 
the mutual strengths of each agency and clarifying their roles in relation to 
improving law and order in the region.  As a result of this partnership, 
AusAID and AFP officers have been seconded to each other’s agencies, and 
in 2005, it was agreed that while AusAID would maintain coordination of 
support to overseas law and justice sectors, the AFP would be “the first port 
of call” for the Australian aid program’s global policing initiatives.25  Since 
formation of the partnership agreement, the two agencies have increasingly 
                                                 
22 AusAID, Review of Law and Justice Programs—Issues paper (Canberra: AusAID, 2005), p. 1. 
23 AusAID, Pacific Regional Aid Strategy 2004-2009, (Canberra: AusAID, 2004), p. 5. 
24 Ibid., p. 6. 
25 Paul Jevtovic, ‘Harnessing relations—a year in review’, Platypus Magazine (December 2005), 
p. 17. 
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collaborated on the design, implementation and review of Australian support 
to policing agencies throughout the Pacific, to the extent that overseas police 
capacity development is now seen as core AFP business. 
Responding to the expanding demand for police officers to serve in 
peacekeeping, stabilisation and capacity development roles, the Howard 
Government announced the establishment of the International Deployment 
Group (IDG) in early 2004.  The IDG was formed under the auspices of the 
AFP, which already had considerable experience in international 
peacekeeping and peace monitoring.26  According to the then Minister for 
Justice and Customs, the IDG would,  
enable the strategic deployment of personnel undertaking peace-keeping 
operations, restoration of law and order missions and the delivery of 
capacity building initiatives in the region.27 
As well as training personnel, the IDG plans and manages international 
police deployments of both Australian and Pacific Islander police and 
civilians.28  It currently has approximately 360 members deployed in capacity 
building initiatives in Nauru, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, 
Cambodia and Vanuatu, as well as in peacekeeping missions in Cyprus, 
Sudan, Afghanistan and Timor-Leste.  A significant boost to IDG funding—
$493 million over five years—was approved by government in August 2006.  
The IDG Future Strategy projected a staff increase of 400 bringing total IDG 
personnel to 1,200 over a two year period, amounting to the largest single 
increase in AFP staff since the force was established in 1979.29  This 
included the creation of an Operational Response Group of 200 people, with 
a high level of readiness to deliver tactical and specialist policing capabilities 
and a particular focus upon international offshore operations.  It also 
included a policing and capacity development group of over 750 people 
located both overseas and in Australia, and promotes greater liaison 
between interoperable agencies such as the AFP and the Australian 
Defence Force. 
While representing a more robust, integrated and security-oriented approach 
than its predecessors, the Howard Government’s Pacific engagement was 
also intended as a cooperative undertaking with the relevant islands’ 
governments.  The phrase “co-operative intervention” was first used by 
                                                 
26 See Abby McLeod and Sinclair Dinnen, ‘New Directions in Australian Regional Policing’, in 
Andrew Goldsmith and James Sheptycki (eds.), Crafting Transnational Policing—Police 
Capacity-Building and Global Policing Reform (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), pp. 295-328. 
27 Chris Ellison, ‘Australia boosts regional law enforcement capacity’, Media Release, 2 
February 2004. 
28 A new $2.8 million AFP International Training Complex was opened outside Canberra in 2005 
and is designed to give Australian and overseas personnel a dedicated facility to help build their 
skills for overseas missions. 
29 Data from Auditor General, Australian Federal Police Overseas Operations, Audit Report, no. 
53 2006-7 (Canberra: Australian National Audit Office, 2007), p. 118.  
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former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in respect of RAMSI but was 
always conceived as having a wider regional application.30  Hence the title of 
the assistance package offered to PNG—the Enhanced Cooperation 
Program.  Australian assistance was to be provided with the support and 
active cooperation of key partners in the recipient countries and, where 
appropriate, regional organisations such as the PIF.  As we shall see, 
maintaining the co-operative quality of these engagements at the political 
level has proved extremely challenging.31  In addition, the new approach 
entailed a commitment to longer, costly and more open-ended interventions, 
as in the case of RAMSI.  This acknowledged the complexity of the 
institutional transformations being sought and represented a significant 
departure from the shorter, often unrealistic, time-frames associated with 
older development approaches. 
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands 
The immediate background to the deployment of RAMSI in July 2003 was 
five years of low-level conflict between rival ethnic militias on the main island 
of Guadalcanal followed by a faltering peace process that deteriorated into a 
process of escalating lawlessness in the national capital, Honiara, and a 
number of other places, as well as economic decline and a progressive 
paralysis of government at national and provincial levels.32  Compensation 
processes—the principal instrument of peacemaking under the Australian-
brokered Townsville Peace Agreement 2000—were rapidly corrupted as a 
result of the threats and greed of a relatively small cohort of former militants, 
political leaders and opportunist criminals.  The Solomon Islands police force 
had effectively collapsed as a result of the ethnic tensions enabling armed 
thugs to act with impunity.  Ordinary citizens, public servants and even 
government ministers faced growing levels of intimidation from criminal 
elements.  By 2003, it was clear that the Solomon Islands Government on its 
own was incapable of restoring law and order and returning the troubled 
archipelago to some semblance of normality. 
RAMSI was mobilised rapidly following the Australian Government’s decision 
to abandon its longstanding non-interventionist stance and accede to a 
request for assistance from then Solomon Islands Prime Minister Sir Allen 
                                                 
30 See Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka, ‘Political legitimacy and state-building 
intervention in the Pacific’, in Greg Fry and Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (eds.), Intervention and 
state-building in the Pacific—the legitimacy of ‘cooperative intervention’ (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008), pp. 1-36. 
31 For a discussion of the politics of the ‘co-operative intervention’ in Solomon Islands see: 
Dinnen and Firth (eds.), Politics and Statebuilding in Solomon Islands. 
32 Detailed accounts of the conflict and its immediate aftermath are provided in: Jon Fraenkel, 
The Manipulation of Custom—From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands (Wellington: 
University of Victoria Press, 2004); and Clive Moore, Happy Isles in Crisis—the historical 
causes for a failing state in Solomon Islands, 1998-2004 (Canberra: Asia-Pacific Press, 2004). 
See also Sinclair Dinnen, ‘Winners and Losers: Politics and Disorder in the Solomon Islands’, 
Journal of Pacific History, vol. 37, no. 3 (2002), pp. 285-298. 
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Kemakeza.33  Although planning, leadership and most of the personnel and 
other resources were supplied by Australia, the intervention was undertaken 
on a regional basis under the auspices of the PIF and its Biketawa 
Declaration of 2000.34  The Facilitation of International Assistance Act set out 
the powers and immunities of mission personnel, as well as empowering the 
Solomon Islands parliament to review the mission annually and, in theory, 
terminate it by revoking consent.35  The mission initially comprised around 
330 police—the Participating Police Force (PPF)—drawn mainly from the 
AFP but including smaller numbers from Australian state forces, New 
Zealand, and other Forum member states.36 With the police as the lead 
agency, approximately 1,800 regional military personnel provided logistical 
support and back-up, while civilian advisers were inserted into key 
government agencies as part of the larger state-building exercise.   
Security was restored quickly to Honiara and most of the conflict-affected 
areas.  A month-long amnesty resulted in the surrender of 3,730 firearms, 
approximately ninety to ninety-five percent of the country’s stockpile.37  Key 
militia leaders were apprehended with around 860 arrests made in the first 
200 days of the mission.38  Cleansing the ranks of the Solomon Islands 
Police Force (SIPF)39 of criminal and undesirable elements entailed the 
removal of over 400 people by early 2004, almost twenty-five percent of the 
total workforce.40  The security work of the mission has been progressively 
integrated into an ambitious long-term state-building exercise whose overall 
goal is a peaceful, well-governed and prosperous Solomon Islands.  
                                                 
33 Michael Fullilove, ‘The Testament of Solomons: RAMSI and International State-Building’, 
Analysis (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, March 2006), p. 7.  The ANAO Audit 
Report on the AFP reveals that they had 70 days in which to plan the deployment, from the time 
that the Solomon Islands Prime Minister requested Australia’s assistance until the Australian 
Government agreed to the terms on which a deployment would be provided. See, Auditor 
General, Australian Federal Police Operations, p. 45. 
34 The PIF is made up of 16 independent or self-governing Pacific states including Australia and 
New Zealand.  PIF’s Biketawa Declaration on Mutual Assistance of 2000 allowed for collective 
action in response to a security crisis in a member state. <www.forumsec.org/_resources/ 
article/files/Biketawa%20Declaration.pdf> [Accessed 28 May 2008]. 
35 Solomon Islands, The Facilitation of International Assistance Act (2003).  
36 The RAMSI website lists the following contributing nations: Australia; Cook Islands; Federated 
States of Micronesia; Fiji (currently suspended); Kiribati; Marshall Islands; Nauru; New Zealand; 
Niue; Palau; Papua New Guinea; Samoa; Tonga; Tuvalu; and Vanuatu.  
 <http://www.ramsi.org/node/8> [Accessed 20 May 2008]. 
37 Robert Muggah, Diagnosing Demand: Assessing the Motivations and Means for Firearms 
Acquisition in the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, State Society and Governance in 
Melanesia Discussion Paper 2004/7 (Canberra: Australian National University, Research School 
of Pacific and Asian Studies, 2004), p. 6. 
38 Figure cited by the then Commander of the Participating Police Force, Ben McDevitt, at the 
One Year Anniversary Press Conference in Honiara, 22 July 2004.  Current figures posted on 
the RAMSI website indicate that over 6300 people have been arrested on more than 9100 
charges laid since RAMSI arrived. <http://www.ramsi.org/node/268> [Accessed 20 May 2008]. 
39 Previously known as the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP). 
40 The RAMSI website states that over 160 former SIPF officers have been arrested for serious 
offences including corruption, murder, assault, rape, intimidation and robbery. 
<http://www.ramsi.org/node/268>. 
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Implementation of this goal is organised around three broad pillars or 
programs:  law and justice; economic governance; and machinery of 
government.41  
As well as rebuilding the SIPF, the law and justice pillar covers assistance to 
judicial institutions and the prison system.  Economic governance includes 
attempts to strengthen public finances, encourage business and economic 
growth, and assistance to rural agriculture.  Machinery of government 
focuses on developing effective cabinet and parliamentary systems, public 
service reform, strengthening oversight institutions, providing electoral and 
civic education, and improving the performance of provincial governance.  
RAMSI advisers—many of them seconded Australian public servants—have 
been placed in a range of Solomon Islands departments and agencies such 
as the Auditor General, Treasury, Finance, Internal Revenue, Customs, 
Solicitor General, Public Prosecutions, the Magistracy and High Court.   
Overall coordination is managed through a Special Coordinator’s Office in 
Honiara,42  headed by a senior Australian diplomat, while Australian-based 
agencies operate through an interdepartmental committee in Canberra.  In 
addition to support channelled through the mission, Australia maintains a 
separate bilateral development program that provides assistance in areas 
like health, education, environmental and natural resource management, and 
community development.43  
RAMSI has no fixed exit date.  Its duration is to be determined according to 
the completion of its various program objectives.  Such an ambitious 
engagement is extremely expensive.  Until recently, the level of Australia’s 
aid to Solomon Islands was relatively modest, especially when compared to 
its very substantial program in PNG.  An average of $7.5 million of Australian 
aid was committed to Solomon Islands annually from 1984 to 1989.44  This 
increased in the late 1990s from $11 million in 1997-98 to $13.3 million in 
1998-99 and $18.7 million in 1999-2000.  In 2000-01 it grew to $35.1 million, 
then to $40.6 million in 2001-02 and $36.2 million in 2002-03.  Australia’s 
financial outlay increased exponentially with RAMSI and has since averaged 
around $200 million per annum.  According to a recent Auditor-General’s 
report, the Australian Government allocated $840.5 million for RAMSI over 
the four years from 2005-08.45  Australian aid to Solomon Islands in 2006-07 
                                                 
41 See RAMSI website for more details: <http://www.ramsi.org/>. 
42 Further details about the Special Coordinator’s Office can be obtained at:  
<http://www.ramsi.org/node/32> [Accessed 28 May 2008]. 
43 See AusAID, Solomon Islands Transitional Country Strategy 2006 to Mid-2007 (Canberra: 
AusAID, 2006). 
44 AusAID figures quoted in Clive Moore, ‘Unchartered Pacific Waters: the Solomon Islands 
Constitution and the Government of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, 2006-7’, History 
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Sinclair Dinnen and Abby McLeod 
- 34 - Security Challenges  
alone was estimated to be $223 million, amounting to 52 percent of total 
estimated aid funding to the Pacific for that year.46 
The speedy and peaceful restoration of law and order has been RAMSI’s 
most notable accomplishment.  Progress has also occurred in other areas 
such as the stabilisation of government finances.  Government revenues 
increased by around 170 percent during the first three years of the 
deployment, largely owing to more efficient systems of revenue collection.47  
Capacity development is now the main focus of the mission’s work with the 
SIPF and other government agencies.  While there has been progress in 
enhancing the quality and training of capacity developers in some areas,48 
significant constraints remain in the way of effective skills transfer.  These 
include matters like the shortage of eligible local counterparts and, in some 
cases, the low level of skills among counterparts and lack of necessary 
infrastructure.49  Measuring the effectiveness of capacity development is 
notoriously difficult.50  RAMSI established a performance framework for this 
purpose in 2005.  Still a work in progress, this framework comprises four 
main instruments:  an annual People’s Survey conducted in each of the nine 
provinces; capacity building stocktakes covering each program; analytical 
reviews; and self-evaluation mechanisms by individual programs.51 
Almost five years after the initial deployment, most Solomon Islanders 
remain supportive of the intervention.  While this level of popular support is a 
major strength of the mission, it is also indicative of the essential fragility of 
peace and reconstruction in the archipelago.  Many citizens remain fearful of 
the consequences of the mission withdrawing and show little faith in the 
integrity and capacity of Solomon Islands institutions and political processes.  
Data from the People’s Survey suggests that while there has been an 
increase in community security since the mission arrived there is still a long 
way to go.  Thus, forty-six per cent of respondents thought that their 
community was safe and peaceful, forty-two percent thought there were 
sometimes problems, while nine percent said there were many problems.52  
Women, young women in particular, were less likely to say that communities 
                                                 
46 Ibid.  AusAID treats PNG and the Pacific as two separate entities for purposes of its 
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48 For example, the Annual Performance Report 2006/2007 notes improvements in the law and 
justice program relating to the recruitment of advisers, induction and language training for 
advisers, as well as with counterpart involvement in adviser performance assessment.  John 
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2007), p. 13. 
49 Ibid, p. 8. 
50 See, for example, Heather Baser, Provision of Technical Assistance Personnel on the 
Solomon Islands: what can we learn from the RAMSI experience?, Discussion Paper, no. 76 
(Maastricht: European Centre for Development Policy Management, September 2007). 
51 See RAMSI website: <http://www.ramsi.org/node/14 > [Accessed 28 May 2008]. 
52 Figures from the People’s Survey quoted in: Winter and Schofield, Annual Performance 
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were safe and peaceful, and almost twice as likely as men to say that there 
were many problems.  Significantly, the People’s Survey reveals that 
approximately eighty percent of Solomon Islanders are concerned that 
violent conflict might return if RAMSI leaves and that high levels of mistrust 
continue to exist among people from different provinces.53  These findings 
also point to one of the most fundamental concerns with Australia’s 
enhanced Pacific engagement, namely the issue of long-term sustainability.  
While both the Howard and Rudd Governments have provided substantial 
resources and personnel to RAMSI, it is unlikely that this level of 
commitment will remain indefinite.  What happens when RAMSI leaves as 
ultimately it must? 
The Enhanced Cooperation Program in Papua New Guinea 
Whilst never declared a failed state like Solomon Islands, PNG has been 
variously described as a “weak state”, a “basket case”, a state “on the brink,” 
and a potential “rogue state”.54  PNG has long been renowned for its lack of 
social, economic and political stability, as well as serious problems of law 
and order in urban areas (such as Port Moresby and Lae) and some rural 
areas, most notably the Highlands region.  In addition to problems of 
generalised crime, PNG has experienced a major conflict in Bougainville 
(1989-1997), and significant inter-group fighting frequently occurs around 
major resource extraction sites, such as those in the Southern Highlands 
and Enga Provinces.    
High levels of disorder in some regions of the country enjoy a circular 
relationship with the operation of basic state and social services.  In part, 
they reflect the weakness of the relationship between state and society and 
the state’s inability to provide basic services; but violence also further 
undermines the provision of those services and can act as a significant 
disincentive to investment and economic activity.  Improving law and order in 
PNG has thus long been a priority for donors, notably Australia, engaged in 
the promotion of security and development.55   
Despite the very different circumstances of both countries, in 2003 Australian 
journalist Paul Kelly commented that  
                                                 
53 See Solomon Islands People’s Survey Pilot, 2006, 
<http://www.ramsi.org/files/People%20Survey%20Pilot%202006.pdf> [Accessed 28 May 2008]. 
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Papua New Guinea (Canberra: ASPI, 2004), Hughes, ‘Aid Has Failed the Pacific’, p. 2; Susan 
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55 See Abby McLeod, ‘Police reform in Papua New Guinea’, in A. Brown (ed.), Security and 
Development in the Pacific Islands (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), pp. 
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the Australian-led intervention [in Solomon Islands] is a new strategic 
principle with potential to apply to other nations across the Melanesia 
trouble zone where PNG is the pivotal player.56 
With almost sixteen years of ‘traditional’ development assistance having 
being provided to the RPNGC under the AusAID funded, consultant 
implemented, RPNGC Development Project (1989-2005), on 30 June 2004, 
Australia and PNG signed a treaty establishing the ECP, committing an 
additional A$800 million to PNG over a five-year period for the police-led 
intervention.  Under this program, it was anticipated that in-line personnel 
would be placed in central government agencies (including legal, economic 
and financial specialists), and that approximately 230 Australian police 
officers would be seconded to the RPNGC, where they would hold line 
positions in Port Moresby, Lae, Mt Hagen, the Highlands Highway and 
Bougainville.  The policing component of the intervention, however, was 
short-lived, with the withdrawal of the entire contingent on 13 May 2005, due 
to a high court decision that rendered the deployment of Australian police 
officers with full immunities unconstitutional.57 
While short in duration, the policing component of the ECP saw Australian 
police deploy to both Port Moresby and Bougainville.  Australian police 
deployed under the ECP were collectively known as the Australian Assisting 
Police (AAP), being sourced from both the AFP and various Australian state 
police forces.  Although it was originally envisaged that the Australian police 
would hold line positions, upon deployment they worked strictly as advisers, 
being instructed to assist, rather than do.  Australian police and civilians 
worked in a variety of specialist policing, general policing and support areas, 
including (but not limited to) human resources, finance, logistics, fraud, legal, 
communications, criminal investigators, prosecutions and general duties in 
stations throughout Port Moresby, as well as in Buka and Arawa in 
Bougainville.   
Australian police were by and large welcomed by the community.  Their 
deployment occurred amidst community perceptions that PNG police 
inadequately policed the community, resulting in increasing crime and 
decreasing public safety.  Whilst many people noted the gross wealth 
disparities between the Australian police and themselves—a disparity that 
exists between the majority of expatriates and Papua New Guineans—
people welcomed their presence, reported increased feelings of safety, 
demonstrated greater willingness to report crime and subsequently publicly 
mourned the departure of the AAP.   
Since the withdrawal of the policing component of the ECP in 2005, the 
RPNGC has received minimal donor support, with the exception of technical 
assistance provided by a handful of advisers employed under the 
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AusAID/PNG Law and Justice Sector Program.  However, in the context of a 
new Australian Government committed to long-term engagement with the 
Pacific,58 as outlined below, renewed and refocussed Australian support to 
the RPNGC is imminent. 
The Deterioration in Bilateral Relations 
The eruption of serious public disturbances in Honiara in April 2006 provided 
an unanticipated set-back for the mission.  Much of the capital’s Chinatown 
district was destroyed.59  Mission and Solomon Islands police appear to have 
been caught off guard and overseas reinforcement were required to restore 
order.  Criticisms were directed at RAMSI and the PPF in particular.60 Public 
anger was initially provoked by the announcement of an unpopular Prime 
Minister-elect following the 2006 elections.  Less spectacular, though more 
damaging, was the rapid deterioration in bilateral relations between Australia 
and Solomon Islands after the establishment of a new government led by 
Menasseh Sogavare in May 2006.61  The collaborative nature of ‘co-
operative intervention’ renders it especially vulnerable to shifting local 
political allegiances.62  The extent of this vulnerability was demonstrated 
when the largely compliant Kemakeza-led government was replaced by the 
more hostile Sogavare-led administration.  During the following twenty 
months an acrimonious struggle took place between the Solomon Islands 
and Australian Governments over control of the regional mission.  RAMSI 
was positioned uncomfortably between the two governments upon which it 
depended most—the first for its authorisation to continue and the second as 
the source of most its personnel and resources.  These developments also 
made it extremely difficult for the mission, and especially the police,63 to 
maintain an image of detached political neutrality. 
One of Prime Minister Sogavare’s first acts was to call for a review of the 
mission, and a clear exit strategy.  He also appointed as ministers two MPs 
who had been detained by police on suspicion of involvement in the April 
disturbances.  As well as expressing concern over his choice of ministers, 
Australia and New Zealand opposed any substantive changes to RAMSI on 
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the grounds that it was an integrated package not amenable to being ‘cherry 
picked’.64  Amid mounting rancour at political levels, the Solomon Islands 
Government abruptly expelled the Australian High Commissioner for 
allegedly interfering in local politics.  In retaliation, visa restrictions were 
imposed on Solomon Islands’ politicians seeking entry to Australia. 
A major source of contention was Prime Minister Sogavare’s campaign to 
appoint an Australian lawyer, Julian Moti, as his new Attorney General.  
Critics saw this as an attempt to install a key ally in this important office in 
order to protect Sogavare’s political interests and undermine mission efforts 
to strengthen the rule of law.  The AFP announced that they wanted to 
question Moti in relation to child sex charges in Vanuatu ten years 
previously.  He was later arrested while in transit in PNG at the request of 
Australian police seeking his extradition.  After failing to attend a scheduled 
bail hearing, he was secretly flown to Solomon Islands in a PNG Defence 
Force aircraft.  The apparent collusion between the two Melanesian 
governments, as well as the refusal by veteran PNG Prime Minister Sir 
Michael Somare to release the findings of a Board of Inquiry into Moti’s 
escape, infuriated the Howard Government and led to what was arguably the 
lowest point in relations between Australia and its former colony since the 
latter’s independence in 1975. 
In Solomon Islands, Sogavare upped the stakes by sacking Shane Castles, 
the Australian-born SIPF commissioner, whom he accused of following 
Australian orders.  In February 2007, the Australian Foreign Minister took the 
remarkable step of writing an open letter to the people of Solomon Islands in 
which he berated Prime Minister Sogavare for trying to undermine the 
regional mission.65  Commenting on the overall tenor of exchanges between 
Canberra, Port Moresby and Honiara at this time, strategic analyst Hugh 
White lamented the reversion to a ‘puerile, immature diplomacy’.66  Periodic 
threats were made by the Solomon Islands Government to terminate the 
mission though strong protests from many of its own citizens rendered such 
a prospect unlikely.  Julian Moti was eventually sworn-in as Attorney General 
in July 2007.  By the time of the Australian elections in November 2007, the 
cooperative dimension of Australia’s ‘co-operative intervention’ had 
descended into open confrontation with the Sogavare Government in 
Honiara and an awkward stand-off with the Somare administration in Port 
Moresby. 
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New Rudd Approach 
As articulated in the Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) National Platform, an 
underlying premise of the ALP’s approach to the region is the belief that  
if you have good relations with your neighbours, it is good for your security 
and if you have bad relations with your neighbours, it is bad for your 
security.67 
Comprehensive regional engagement and improved diplomatic relations 
were therefore posited as key weapons against insecurity in the region.  By 
the campaign for office in late 2007, the deterioration of relations with 
Australia’s near neighbours in Melanesia under the Howard Government 
provided then Opposition Leader, Kevin Rudd, with a significant opportunity 
to distinguish the ALP’s approach to the Pacific from that of the Coalition.    
In July 2007,68 Rudd called for renewed attention to the region, expressing 
concerns about:  the costs of reactive rather than proactive responses to 
regional instability; the potential increase of refugees to Australia due to 
ethnic and political violence in the region; the growing risk to Australian 
public health posed by the HIV pandemic in PNG; and the unprecedented 
strategic opportunity for other non-regional states to displace Australian 
interests in the region due to its fragile relations with many Pacific islands 
countries.  Playing to domestic concerns about Australian national security 
and physical safety, Rudd repeated these concerns one month later.69  
Closer to the election, a joint Labor media statement announced that “…to 
help avoid continuing instability and revolving door military deployments”, a 
new Asia Pacific Centre for Civil-Military Cooperation would be established 
under a Labor Government.70 
Drawing upon former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s claim that there 
could be “no development without security, and no security without 
development”, Rudd announced his party’s intention to implement a long-
term Pacific Partnership for Development and Security, which would 
simultaneously tackle a number of issues including primary education and 
healthcare, infrastructure, youth unemployment through targeted public 
works programs, microfinance, good governance, and effective security 
assistance and capacity building with local police.71  Whilst echoing the 
Howard Government’s concern with the region’s fragile states—and the 
possibility of those states harbouring terrorist cells—Rudd explicitly identified 
poverty eradication as an important way of addressing regional security.   
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Following his election as Prime Minister in November 2007, Kevin Rudd 
sought to transform Australia’s relations with the Pacific islands early in his 
term, announcing the position of Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Affairs, 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and apologising to Australia’s indigenous ‘stolen 
generation’, closing offshore processing centres in Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea, visiting both Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands in March 
2008, and declaring Australia’s desire to host the 2009 Pacific Islands 
Forum.  In a series of media releases and press conferences, he 
emphasised the principles of mutual trust, responsibility and cooperation as 
key to Australia’s partnerships with its regional neighbours,72 as articulated in 
the Port Moresby Declaration of 6 March, 2008.73 
The Port Moresby Declaration announces a “new era of cooperation” and 
firmly situates Australia “within” rather than “outside” the region by 
emphasising shared challenges such as climate change.  Interestingly, the 
declaration specifies the “Pacific Partnerships for Development” as the 
mechanism through which better development outcomes (including meeting 
the UN Millennium Development Goals) are to be achieved, while the 
security focus of the previously proposed “Pacific Partnerships for 
Development and Security” is entirely absent.  Having satisfied domestic 
concerns about national security prior to the election, references to regional 
security are conspicuously absent from post-election policy statements about 
the Pacific, perhaps indicating a healthy awareness that security is a 
sensitive issue in a region readily associated with state weakness and 
fragility. 
The removal of ‘security’ from the Pacific Partnerships for Development 
initiative does not mean a lack of concern about regional security on the part 
of the Labor Government.  For example, under the 2008-09 Budget, the 
Australian Federal Police was awarded close to eighty million to implement a 
Pacific Police Development Program over a four year period.74  This program 
includes a raft of regional and bilateral initiatives, including a PNG-Australia 
Policing Partnership (APP), which will operate in close collaboration with the 
existing AusAID/PNG Law and Justice Sector Program.  Reflecting—but not 
directly derived from—the new government’s approach, the APP is premised 
upon long-term engagement and the development of mutually agreed 
objectives.  Moreover, it embraces key aspects of best-development 
practice, such as mutual accountability, working through local systems and 
processes (where possible) and fostering local ownership.  
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Given its short time in office, it is too early to demonstrate the practical 
application of the Rudd Government’s policy announcements on the Pacific.   
Moreover, it is easy to conflate changes in agency policy and activities (e.g. 
those of the AFP) with the government’s ‘new approach’ to the region.  In 
many instances, recent shifts in approach can be attributed to agency 
learning and institutional evolution, rather than to the change of government.   
However, Rudd’s emphasis upon long-term engagement and genuine 
partnerships can only further improve the ways in which both individual 
agencies and the government as a whole support development and security 
in our immediate region.  As highlighted recently by Greg Fry, there has 
been a fundamental shift in the way in which Australia conducts dialogue 
with Pacific states, which in keeping with Labor party ideology, should 
contribute to regional security.75  Whether or not the new government will 
continue the interventionist approach of the Howard Government (through, 
for example in-line rather than advisory assistance) to the Pacific—albeit in a 
more neighbourly manner—remains to be seen. 
Conclusions 
While Pacific islanders share many of Australia’s concerns for security in the 
region, their own concerns frequently differ significantly from those of 
Australian policy makers, who focus primarily upon strengthening existing 
state institutions and addressing governance issues such as corruption and 
accountability.  While these issues certainly worry Pacific islanders—albeit 
the small percentage of them (particularly Melanesians) who actually have 
access to state institutions—more parochial daily issues such as domestic 
violence, assault, burglary and sexual violence, rather than corruption and 
accountability, lie at the heart of their security concerns.76  Although 
improving accountability and eliminating corruption might ultimately improve 
the ability of state institutions to respond to these problems, in the short term 
Pacific islanders are seeking more immediate responses to their security 
concerns, which cannot be met by a distant state.  Relatively recent 
innovations such as the Community Justice Liaison Unit in PNG, which 
seeks to bring state and non-state actors closer together in the fight against 
crime, possess greater potential than traditional state strengthening 
exercises to bring the external and internal security agendas closer 
together.77  In this respect, the Rudd Government’s commitment to engaging 
civil society in the delivery of basic services (which may include community 
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policing and crime prevention strategies),78 might assist Australian aid to 
security institutions to better meet the needs of Pacific islanders, particularly 
those living in rural areas.   
Despite the new rhetoric of ‘partnership’ and mutual cooperation, it is likely 
that capacity building or capacity development will remain a key aim of 
Australian aid programs in the Pacific.  The subject of capacity 
development—namely capacity—is defined by the United Nations 
Development Program as “the ability of individuals, organisations and 
societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve 
objectives in a sustainable manner.”79  By extension, capacity development 
is the process through which the abilities to do so are obtained, 
strengthened, adapted and maintained over time by internal and external 
stakeholders.  Capacity development must therefore be seen not only as an 
externally driven exercise, but also as an indigenous process of change and 
evolution.80  The prominence of technical assistance in external capacity 
development initiatives, however, highlights the unspoken assumption that 
outsiders ‘know’ how to do the things that ‘locals’ ought to do in order to 
improve their capacity.  As highlighted by McLeod, this assumption explicitly 
contradicts local perceptions of capacity development, whereby the external 
skill set is seen by ‘recipients’ to be merely one of many approaches, rather 
than a superior way of doing.81   
It will be interesting to observe the ways in which future engagements with 
Pacific islands institutions operationalise the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ so as to 
facilitate genuine sharing of skills and experience, rather than further 
entrench existing perceptions of Australian superiority in the region.  Recent 
moves, such as the AFP’s involvement of Pacific islanders in the delivery of 
pre-deployment training, demonstrate increasing awareness of the fact that 
those traditionally designated as ‘recipients’ of aid are simultaneously 
developing the capacity of those who ‘provide support’.  These processes of 
exchange are limited not only to awareness of other languages and cultures, 
but also to alternative and more innovative ‘ways of doing’, including informal 
dispute resolution and different approaches to community policing.82 
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